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COST OF SERVICE INDEXING: AN ANALYSIS
OF NEW MEXICO'S EXPERIMENT IN
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
DAVID S. COHEN* and CHARLES FULTON NOBLE**
In April of 1975, the New Mexico Public Service Commission
(hereinafter referred to as Commission) issued its decision in Case
No. 1196 which established an innovative ratemaking methodology
known as Cost of Service Indexing (hereinafter referred to as COSI)
to be used in determining rates for the Public Service Company of
New Mexico (PNM).' COSI provides for an automatic periodic adjustment to the rates of the Public Service Company of New Mexico
when it is determined that earnings on the common equity investment are above or below a certain rate of return. The COSI methodology is viewed as an experiment in ratemaking. 2 The Order granting
COSI contemplated a review of the methodology to assess its merits
after a sufficient time had elapsed. In January of 1978, the Commission docketed an investigation of COS. 3 In December of the same
year, the Commission, after extensive hearings, decided that it would
continue using COSI with certain modifications as a ratemaking
methodology.4
COSI is a unique method of ratemaking with characteristics which
make it justifiable only if the regulated utility meets certain criteria.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the COSI experience in light
of the regulatory lessons learned.
A public utility, as defined by New Mexico law, is a person who
furnishes electricity, gas, water or steam to the public (with certain
exceptions).' Such public utilities are regulated in New Mexico by
the New Mexico Public Service Commission, 6 which has the principal
*J.D. Chicago Kent College of Law, Member New Mexico Bar. Counsel to the New
Mexico Public Service Commission. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the
authors alone and do not represent the views of the Public Service Commission.
**J.D. University of New Mexico School of Law. Member New Mexico Bar.
1. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 8 P.U.R. 4th 113 (1975).
2. Id. at 138.
3. In re Public Service Commission's Investigation into the Operation of Public Service
Company's Cost of Service Indexing and Rate Treatment of Construction Work in Progress,
N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. 1419 (1978-79),
-P.U.R.
4th
-[hereinafter
cited
as Case No. 14191.
4. Id.
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-3-3(F) (1978).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-6-4 (1978).
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7
duties of setting or authorizing rates, supervising standards of ser9
vice, 8 allowing or disallowing the issuance of securities, and issuing
certificates of public convenience and necessity.' 0
Public utility companies, in this state and others, are in the position of having a potentially great bargaining power over the consumer of their services. Electricity or natural gas, and often both, has
become a necessity to most people for light, heat and food preparation. 1' Commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises obviously
could not continue without an adequate energy supply.
Coupled with this extraordinary dependence by consumers upon
the services of utility companies is the fact that these companies
operate in an atmosphere relatively free from competition. The utilities have been allowed to be maintained as monopolies within their
designated service areas because of the perception by lawmakers that
consumers would not be benefited by direct competition among the
companies.' 2 Competition would cause an extreme waste of economic and capital resources. This is because competition requires
that the consumer have access to more than one supply of goods and
services, which would mean in the utility industry that each of the
competing companies would have power lines or supply pipes running to each potential user. This duplication of services and goods
would result in higher prices to the consumer and in decreased plant
efficiency.' ' Utilities have also been described as "natural monopolies" because they are "industries in which the efficient scale of slant
[sic] is so large, relative to the size of the market, as to permit the
operation of only one plant of efficient scale."' ' In order to compensate for the lack of competition, public utilities are subjected to a
high degree of regulatory control, including control over rates
charged to consumers.1

7. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-8-7 (1978).
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 62-6-19 (1978).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-6-6 (1978).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-9-1 (1978). N.M. Stat. Ann. § §62-3-1 to 62-3 4, 62-5-1, 62-5-3
to 62-5-11, 62-6-1 to 62-6-24, 62-8-1 to 62-8-9, 62-9-1 to 62-9-2, 62-9-4 to 62-9-6, 62-10-1
to 62-10-16, 62-11-1 to 62-11-7, 62-12-1 to 62-12-7, and 62-13-1 to 62-13-4 (1978) are
known as the Public Utility Act provisions.
11. "Utility service is a necessity of modern life; indeed, the discontinuance of water or
heating for even short periods of time may threaten health and safety. And the risk of an
erroneous deprivation, given the necessary reliance on computers, is not insubstantial."
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
12. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 8 P.U.R. 4th 113, 115-16 (1975).
13. See Parker, The Regulation of Public Utilities, 10 Nat. Res. J. 827 (1970).
14. Id. at 827.
15. Legislative authority to set maximum prices was held constitutional in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), but it cannot be arbitrary or irrelevant to the policy the
legislature is free to adopt. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1933).
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THE DUTY OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Rapidly rising costs in the utility industry, resulting in higher rates
to consumers, have caused ratemaking to become an even more critical concern of regulatory commissions. Setting rates is a difficult and
complex task due to the competing interests, statutory obligations,
market evaluations and business evaluations involved. Nonetheless, it
is the Public Service Commission's duty to insure that rates charged
by the utilities are just and reasonable:
It is the declared policy of the state that the public interest, the

interest of consumers and the interest of investors require the regulation and supervision of such public utilities to the end that reason-

able and proper services shall be available at fair, just and reasonable
rates, and to the end that capital and investment may be encouraged

and attracted so as to provide for the construction, development and

extension, without unnecessary duplication and economic waste of

proper plants and facilities for the rendition of service to the general

public and to industry.'

6

The Consumer Interest
The Commission, in arriving at just and reasonable rates, must
balance the interests of consumers, of investors, and of the public
as a whole. They are not necessarily at odds with one another but the
balance is not always easy to achieve. Theoretically, an efficiently
run business is in the interest of users as well as investors. The consumer benefits by receiving service at the lowest reasonable cost; the
investor benefits by the availability of greater revenue for earnings
and less revenues being expended for operations. The interests do
conflict, however, if the utility charges an unreasonable amount for
its services to the advantage of its investors. Generally, the consumer
articulates his interest by demanding that the rates set be the lowest
reasonable rates based upon a matching of the costs associated with
present services. He is generally not concerned with the future availability and adequacy of utility service. He believes that his monthly
bill should reflect only the cost of his current service and not the
costs associated with the generation, transmission or distribution of
future services. In his estimation, these are just concerns of the investor, who reaps a financial benefit in the form of dividends or stock
appreciation in exchange for the risk he assumes in investing in the
utility. Thus, the consumer interest in most cases is viewed as time
limited-constrained by his current financial ability to pay his current or foreseeable utility bill.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-3-1(B) (1978).
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The Investor Interest
The interests of investors are simply that they receive the greatest
possible return on their investment for any given degree of risk. Their
interests are constitutionally protected to some degree. If the company is not allowed to receive revenues which cover the cost of
supplying the service, then the company and its investors are being
7
deprived of their property by the state without just compensation.1
Investors are also entitled to a reasonable return on the money which
they have invested in the public utility. The United States Supreme
Court in Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Company v. Public
Service Commission' 8 has recognized the right to such a return:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same
time and in the same general part of the country on investments in
other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding
risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits
such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or
speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and
should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money
necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.' 9
This view was reiterated in Federal Power Commission v. Hope
Natural Gas Company:2"
[T] he investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial
integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the
investor or company point of view it is important that there be
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the
capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and
dividends on the stock.2 1
This is consistent with the view that the investment returns which the
company must pay out are part of the cost of doing business, and the
company should receive revenues to cover these costs.
The Public Interest
The public interest is concerned with all present and future consumers and investors and the general citizenry of the state. This
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 521-26 (1898).
262 U.S. 679 (1923).
Id. at 692.
320 U.S. 591 (1944).
Id. at 603.
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concern is predicated upon the duty of the Commission to assure
that reasonable and proper services are made available now and in the

future. Like the consumer interest, the public interest requires that
rates be kept as low as possible, but the time orientation is somewhat
different. It is in the public interest to assure the continuation of
adequate service 2 2 in the foreseeable future, though it may mean
paying higher rates in the present. 2

This requires a long-term view

of a utility's ability to meet the energy demands of present and
future consumers without unnecessary interruptions or cut-backs in
service. The Commission must allow the utility to construct adequate
utility plants or capacity to meet the demand of its service territory.
Capital is commonly attracted through the issuance of debt, preferred stock and common stock. Though the attraction of capital is

in the public interest, in order to construct plants to meet future
demand, it is also in the public interest that it be done in the least
costly manner possible. 2"

This is tied very closely to the return on

investment, for the higher the return is for a given amount of risk,
the more likely it is that capital will be attracted. Therefore, a judg-

ment must be made. The rate of return must be high enough to
attract capital without being so high as to unjustly reward investors.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has stated:
The second concept may be simply stated: That, while the return
for the utility should be sufficient to enable it to obtain funds in the
22. "Adequate service" is currently a hotly debated issue in regulatory circles. The issue
concerns whether the utility planning is reasonable in light of present and foreseeable
economic conditions; is it more costly for society to experience energy shortfalls or is it
more costly for society to maintain our present posture of constructing reserve plants to
avoid this potential?
23. The disparate time orientation of the public and consumer interest creates tensions
and conflict in the regulatory process. For example, two principal issues confronting regulatory bodies today are "phantom taxes" and rate treatment of "construction work in progress." These issues in their simplest form confront the regulator with the question: "Should
present ratepayers contribute additional revenues to the utility for the purpose of constructing additional utility plants to service future customers?" See In re El Paso Elec. Co., 23
P.U.R. 4th 131 (1977).
24. The capital structure of a typical utility includes debt, preferred stock and common
stock. Common stock is the most expensive capital and debt the least expensive. A regulatory commission must be vigilant in assuring that a utility's capital structure is reasonable,
i.e., that the proportion of debt to equity is reasonable. Otherwise, the ratepayer may be
forced to pay rates based upon an uneconomic capital structure. A rule of thumb is that an
optimal capital structure consists of 50% debt, 35% equity and 15% preferred. Another issue
that arises in rate cases concerns the appropriate capital structure for the utility operation of
a parent company. This issue is resolved by a determination of whether the parent company's activities are more or less risky than utility operations. A more risky operation
requires a greater amount of equity investment since bond holders require a greater degree
of participation by junior securities. In such event, utility commissions have established
hypothetical capital structures for the utility operation in order to assure that the ratepayers
are not paying for the costs of non-utility related endeavors. See, e.g. In re Gas Co. of N.M.,
21 P.U.R. 4th 159 (1977).
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capital markets in competition with other businesses of like risk,
that returns should be no greater than necessary for that purpose. 25
This approach implies that if the return on investment is sufficient
to attract necessary capital, then the return will also be sufficient to
protect investors. This assumes, of course, that capital will not be
attracted by issuing new stock at a price which would seriously dilute
the value of old stock, which in the long run would be counterproductive. 2 6
The Commission, then, must balance the interests of investors,
consumers and the public in arriving at rates which are neither confiscatory nor extortionate, and which will allow the company to attract
enough capital to meet the demands of the public.
THE TRADITIONAL RATEMAKING PROCEDURE
Normally, rate change proposals are brought to the Commission
when the utility files a notice with the Commission which states the
proposed rate changes and the intended effective date of such
changes. 2 7 The Commission must be given this notice thirty days in
advance of any intended rate change. The Commission may, after
giving reasonable notice, investigate and hold hearings for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the proposed rates. Until a
decision is made, the Commission must suspend the operation of the
proposed rates. The suspension may last for a period of not more
than nine months after the proposed effective date. If the Commission has not determined whether the rates are lawful within the nine
month period, it may suspend the rates for an additional three
months. The utility, however, may during that time put the rates
into effect under bond, insuring that any rates which are determined
to be excessive will be refunded to the consumer.
If the Commission decides to have a hearing to determine whether
the proposed rates are just and reasonable it follows a procedure
which traditionally consists of four steps. First, a rate base is found,
which is the measure of the current value of property owned by the
utility or investments made by the investor in rendering service to
the public. The threshold issue in determining the rate base is whether a particular piece of property or investment is to be included as
25. State Corp. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 58 N.M. 260, 284, 270 P.2d
685,701 (1954).
26. See In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 8 P.U.R. 4th 113, 128 (1975). It is argued that
the dilution of stock below market value over an extended period of time would result in an
inability to attract capital. The net result would be an inability of the utility to meet its
statutory obligations at worst, or an inability to attract capital at reasonable costs.
27. Rate change procedures are governed by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 62-8-7 (1978).
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part of a utility plant for valuation purposes. Included in this consideration is whether the plant is "used and useful" in providing
utility service.2 8 Once a determination is made to include the plant
in the rate base, the value of the plant must be ascertained. The
Commission determines the original cost, and reproduction cost of
equipment. In establishing this property valuation the Commission
has utilized a ratio of the two valuations of equipment. 2 9 Recently,
regulatory commissions have begun to utilize the end result method
in determining property valuation. 3 0
Second, a proper rate of return must be found. The rate of return
on the property included in the rate base is arrived at through capital
market evaluations, and the Commission must use its judgment in
determining what a fair and reasonable rate of return is for each
company.
Third, the Commission must determine the operating expenses of
the company. Then the revenue requirement is found by multiplying
the rate base by the rate of return and adding it in the operating
expenses. The revenue requirement arrived at in this manner should
give the company a reasonable return on its investment.
One writer has described the process as follows:
... [R] ate regulation can be expressed by the formula R=O+
(V-D)r, where R is the total revenue to be obtained, 0 is the operating costs, V is the value of the tangible and intangible property, D
is the accrued depreciation of the tangible and reproducible property, and r is the rate of return. Establishment of the total revenue
requirement thus involves three steps: (1) determination of the costs
of operation, (2) determination of the value of the property minus
accrued depreciation,3 known as the rate base, and (3) determination
of the rate of return. 1
Fourth, a proper rate design must be established. This is the
process by which the total rate increase is allocated between the
different classes of customers in order to satisfy the revenue requirement.
THE COST OF SERVICE INDEXING PROCEDURE
The Regulatory Procedure
As implemented by the Commission in Case No. 1196, the general
procedures for setting rates for the Public Service Company of New
28. See Alto Village Serv. Corp. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 92 N.M. 323, 587
P.2d 1334 (1978).
29. See, e.g., In re El Paso Elec. Co., 23 P.U.R. 4th 131 (1977).
30. For a discussion of the end result method see text accompanying foonotes 38-50.
31. C. Phillips Jr., The Economics of Regulation 178 (rev. ed. 1972); see also, 1 A. Priest,
Principles of Public Utility Regulation ch. 4-5 (1969).
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Mexico were substantially modified. Under the 1196 Order, the Public Service Company of New Mexico would periodically submit accounting reports to the Commission. The reports were checked
against the Company's books and records, and verified by Commission staff accountants. 3 2 The reports were used to determine from
the preceding twelve-month accounting period the Company's earned
rate of return on the book value of its common equity capital
(ROE). If the return on common equity fell within the range of
13.5% to 14.5% then no adjustment in rates was made for the subsequent period. If, based upon the accounting report, the return on
common equity fell below 13.5%, the company was allowed to increase its rates by a factor calculated to bring its return up to the
13.5% level. If the return on common equity was above 14.5% the
Company had to decrease its rates by a factor calculated to bring its
return down to the 14.5% level. Rate adjustments were by the kilowatt hour of consumption, and were applied to the energy charges
for each class of service. 3
This arrangement automatically passed the Company's business
costs, including costs of capital, on to the consumer. Fuel costs and
purchased power costs are passed on under a separate fuel adjustment procedure. 34 The adjustments under COSI were automatic in
the sense that hearings were not held each time an adjustment was
made, but the accounting reports of the Company were verified by
the Commission accountants.
The DepartureFrom TraditionalRatemaking
The COSI procedure departs from the traditional ratemaking processes in three ways. First and foremost, it allows rates to go into
effect without a formal hearing. Thus, the adversary process is dispensed with in establishing rates. In justifying this departure from
normal ratemaking processes the Commission stated in 1196:
Yet the commisision [sic] has had very little opportunity, because
it is always involved in rate cases and because its staff is always in
rate cases, to inquire systematically into whether the company is
being efficiently managed, whether its prospective growth in demand
really justifies the construction program, whether appropriate adjustments in rate structures might temper the growth in demand and
thereby reduce the need for construction and for further rate in32. Supplemental Order No. 1196, April 1, 1977. The Commission based its decision to
modify the order on two grounds: (1) an increase in auditing staff; and (2) a savings of
money.
33. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 8 P.U.R. 4th 113, 122-24 (1975).
34. Id. at 122.
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creases, whether the construction program has the mix of facilities
which will result in minimum cost, whether the financing program
will result in the lowest cost of capital. These are where the bodies
are buried. These are where the real bucks are for a commission to
get into to save the consumers some money and it can't do that
while sitting in a rate case inquiring about line 6, column 9 from
some very erudite accounting witness. It's in these neglected areas
which the commission could, as its other choice, begin to exercise
some control over events, or could at least get a reasonable assurance
that the costs being incurred by the company, which costs after all
in the long run are borne by the ratepayer, are no more than is
necessary, and the inability of the commission, tied up in one case
after another, one rate case after another, actively to inquire into
such matters boils down to a simple formula: the situation is out of
the control of the commission, faced with just a dreadful problem of
a responsibility which it can't adequately exercise.
To get out of that box, to get control of the situation again, it is
necessary that the commission liberate itself from the tyranny of the
rate case cycle. This it can do, I think, by the adoption of a cost-ofservice adjustment clause constructed and supervised in such a way
that ratepayers never pay for more than the cost truly incurred by
the company, and the company is able to earn the rate of return to
which the commission says it is entitled, but cannot earn an excessive rate of return by that standard. The rate case load might then
become manageable, and the hands of the commission and its staff,
freed to deal with the more important policy questions facing the
company, the commission and above all, the consuming public. Only
in that way can the commission begin to get the fullest understanding of, and control over, the factors which are giving rise to contin3
ually increasing costs. 5
The Commission, however, withdrew its characterization of traditional ratemaking as "the tyranny of the rate-case cycle" in a subsequent case involving a request for COSI by Gas Company of New
Mexico:
[T] he commission is compelled to modify our characterization of
traditional rate cases in 1196 as the "tyranny of the rate case cycle."
This should not be interpreted as a retreat from our position in 1196
that COSI promises to improve the efficiency and the input of this
commission and staff. We are merely reconfirming our belief that the
traditional rate case cycle has historically proven to be an excellent
mechanism to assure the fair and complete presentation of differing
points 6 of view facilitating the achievement of regulatory objec3
tives.
35. Id. at 133-34.
36. In re Gas Co. of N.M., 21 P.U.R. 4th 159, 164-65 (1977).
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The original COSI process for reviewing company costs and operations relied upon the skills of auditors. Under this procedure, the
Company submitted accounting reports (COSI reports) to the Commission. The reports were checked against the books and records of
the Company and verified by Commission staff auditors. The Order
originally specified that the verification process would be conducted
by certified public accountants under contract to the Commission.
However, the 1196 Order was modified to allow staff to conduct the
verification process, expressing the notion that trained auditors are
all that is required to verify utility costs. It was felt that once a
regulatory decision had been made regarding the appropriateness of
general cost items, all the regulator needed to do was verify that the
costs were actually incurred for utility operations.
Second, COSI established a certainty of time for a rate increaseevery three months. Under traditional ratemaking a utility's rate
increase request is subject to prolonged regulatory scrutiny-up to
ten months in New Mexico. After a final order is issued by the
Commission, additional time may elapse if the decision is appealed
(up to two additional years). Since the utility's rate request is based
upon its historical operating conditions as reflected by a test year at
the time of filing its request, the rate relief which is ultimately
granted by either the Commission or the courts is based upon stale
economic data. Inflationary trends decrease the adequacy of the relief obtained thereby depriving utility investors of their ability to
earn the return on the investment they are adjudged to deserve. This
phenomenon is often referred to as "regulatory lag." COSI did not
eliminate regulatory lag but made it predictable. It provided for a
time certain when the investor could be assured of a final determination by the Commission of the rates to be charged.
Finally, COSI is a departure from the traditional method of setting
rates because it is expressly an "end result" approach. 3 It focuses
on the revenues received by the company, as determined from its
return on common equity, rather than focusing on a property valuation of the company and the rate of return on that property.
THE LEGAL BASIS OF COST OF SERVICE INDEXING
"End Result" Doctrine
Cost of service indexing is based on the theory that the Public
Service Commission need not follow any one method for examining
37. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); In re Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M.
315, 224 P.2d 155 (1950); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico State Corp.
Comm'n, 90 N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977).
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or establishing rates, so long as the "end result" is just and reasonable. 3 8 The end result doctrine was enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Company" 9 in 1944: "Under the statutory standard of 'just and
reasonable' it is the result reached not the method employed which is
controlling." 4 More recently, in In re Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases,4 1 the Court set out the standards by which the end result of
the Federal Power Commission's orders should be measured:
The Commission cannot confine its inquiries either to the computation of costs of service or to conjectures about the prospective
responses of the capital market; it is instead obliged at each step of
its regulatory process to assess the requirements of the broad public

interests entrusted to its protection by Congress. Accordingly, the
"end result" of the Commission's orders must be measured as much
by the success with which they protect those interests as by the
effectiveness with
which they "maintain * * * credit and * * * at42
tract capital."
This language, though it requires that the public interest be considered by the Federal Power Commission, still focuses on the end
result rather than the method used in arriving at rates. It is an indication, however, that the Court, when reviewing the end result, will
expect an awareness by the Federal Power Commission of the consumer interests as well as the investor interest. It should be noted
that Hope and the Permian Basin Rate Cases both involved questions
concerning the Federal Power Commission and its authority under
federal statutes. These statutes are similar but not identical to the
New Mexico Public Utility Act. Nonetheless, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has recognized the end result doctrine and has applied it in its review of the ratemaking functions of the State Corporation Commission 4 3 and the Public Service Commission. 4 4 In the
1977 case of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v.
New Mexico State Corporation Commission,4 the New Mexico
38. Id.

39. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
40. Id. at 602.

41. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
42. Id. at 791 (footnotes omitted).
43. The State Corporation Commission was created by the New Mexico State Constitution, N.M. Const. Art. 11, § 1. It has the duties, among others, of "fixing, determining,
supervising, regulating and controlling all charges and rates of railway, express, telegraph,
telephone, sleeping car and other transportation and transmission companies and common
carriers within the state . .. " N.M. Const. art. 11, § 7. State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 54 N.M. 315, 224 P.2d 155 (1950); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico
State Corp. Comm'n, 90 N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977).
44. See Southern Union Gas Co v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 330, 503
P.2d 310 (1972).
45. 90 N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977).
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Supreme Court stated that "[tihe [Corporation] Commission was
not bound to the use of any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates. The ratemaking function involves the
making of pragmatic adjustments. It is4 the result reached, not the
method employed which is controlling." 6
The use of an "end result" approach to ratemaking, such as Cost
of Service Indexing, does not change the statutory or constitutional
limits on the Public Service Commission's exercise of its ratemaking
authority. The resulting rates must still be within the "zone of
reasonableness" 4 7 between confiscation and extortion, and by statute, must be "fair, just and reasonable" while protecting the interests
of investors, consumers and the public.4 Additionally, there is the
requirement that determinations made by the Public Service Commission must be based on "substantial evidence." 4 9 The Commission
has construed this to mean that the adoption of the cost of service
indexing method itself must be just and reasonable as determined
from substantial evidence.' 0 If the resulting rates meet these tests,
then it is probable that the end result doctrine would limit the
court's scrutiny of the method used.
COSIAs An Automatic Adjustment Clause
One possible criticism of cost of service indexing is that approval
of the COSI rate adjustment does not require a public hearing. A
hearing, however, may not be legally required. The applicable statute
reads: "Whenever there is filed with the commission by any public
utility a schedule proposing a new rate or rates, the commission may,
either upon complaint or upon its own initiative, upon reasonable
notice, enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate
or rates."" 1 This indicates that the holding of a public hearing is
discretionary with the Commission. Even if the statute did not use
discretionary language, a hearing may not be required for each rate
adjustment so long as the indexing procedure itself was approved at a
public hearing.' 2 This is based on the justification that the formula
46. Id. at 338, 563 P.2d at 544.
47. State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 315, 338, 224 P.2d 155, 170

(1950).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-3-1 (1978).
49. Llano v. Southern Union Gas Co., 75 N.M. 7, 399 P.2d 646 (1964); Alto Village
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 92 N.M. 323, 587 P.2d 1334 (1978).
50. Case No. 1419 at 11.
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 62-8-7 (1978) (emphasis added).
52. Consumer's Organization for Fair Energy Equality, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils.,
-Mass.
-,
335 N.E.2d 341 (1975); Contra, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 Wis.2d 344, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978).
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for fixing the rates does not change from the form approved at the
public hearing, only the numbers change. 5 3
Courts have also held that the lack of a public hearing before rates
are changed does not in itself violate the due process clause of the
constitution. 4 This is based on the reasoning that consumers have
no vested property rights in any fixed utility rates. 5 5
Additionally, it has been argued that an automatic adjustment
clause is an improper delegation of authority by the regulatory commission to the utility company. The argument has been rejected by
several courts, the most recent being the Court of Appeals of Indiana
in Capital Improvement Board of Managers of Marion County v.
Public Service Commission.5 6 Moreover, an automatic fuel adjustment clause was found lawful by the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Maestas v. New Mexico Public Service Commission,"7 though the
issue of delegation of authority was not squarely addressed. So long
as the Commission retains proper oversight of the utility company
and its rate changes, and has the power to prevent unjust rate
changes from going into effect, it seems likely that there is no unlawful delegation of authority.' 8
The Public Service Commission, moreover, does not view COSI as
a device which will do away with hearings, even if they are discretionary. The Commission has stated:
We believe that hearings are a meaningful mechanism for achieving
regulatory goals. In fact, under COSI, we do not expect that hearings
are unnecessary. We fully anticipate that the hearing process will be
utilized to resolve issues concerning such matters as rate design,
construction programs, intra-corporate relationships, and energy

conservation activities.

Finally, we believe that an essential ingredient in the traditional

ratemaking process is intervenor input. Therefore, we fully expect
that the monitoring of the COSI reports and the development of

53. Consumer's Organization for Fair Energy Equality, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils.,
__Mass.
-, 335 N.E.2d 341, 345-46 (1975).
54. Holt v. Yonce, 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973), affd, 415 U.S. 969 (1974); Sellers
v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Georgia Power Project v.
Georgia Power Co., 409 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
55. Sellers v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Georgia
Power Project v. Georgia Power Co., 409 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
56. Capital Improvement Bd. of Managers of Marion County v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
__
Ind. App. , 375 N.E.2d 616 (1978); see e.g., City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec.
and Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140 (1955); City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce

Comm'n, 13 Ill. 2d 607, 150 N.E.2d 776 (1958); Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Power &
Light Co., 250 N.C. 421, 109 S.E.2d 253 (1959).
57. Maestas v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 85 N.M. 571, 514 P.2d 847 (1973).
58. Id. at 573, 512 P.2d at 849.
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new reporting and procedural requirements will5 not only involve
staff and PNM but other interested parties as well. 9
The Burden of Proof on a Utility Company which Requests COSI
In late 1976, the Gas Company of New Mexico filed with the
Public Service Commission a new rate schedule along with a petition
requesting that the company be allowed to use cost of service indexing to set rates in the future. 6 0 The request for COSI was denied
because the Gas Company was unable to overcome its burden:
Since COSI represents a very substantial change in the methods and
procedures historically followed for utility rate regulation, the commission believes that an additional burden for justifying the COSI

procedure falls upon the utility desiring its implementation. The

utility must show facts which establish that the "traditional"

methods followed by this commission when applied to it are inadecommensurate with the public, conquate to ensure an end result
6 1
sumer, and investor interests.

The showings which a company requesting COSI must make are
directly related to the purposes of the method. COSI's primary purpose is to allow a utility company to attract capital more readily, and
less expensively than could be done using a traditional ratemaking
method. Thus, the first, and probably most important, showing which
a company should make is that it requires an extraordinary amount
of new capital if it is to serve the public properly. Showing the need
to raise vast amounts of capital is not enough, however, if the utility
company can raise the capital through traditional ratemaking
methods. The amount of capital needed in relation to the company's
existing size of operation probably provides the standard by which a
commission would determine the need for COSI. When the Public
Service Company of New Mexico was granted COSI, it showed that it
needed to raise enough capital to finance construction costs in the
amount of approximately 250% of its undepreciated costs of current
plant. 6 2 Compared to this is the showing which the Gas Company of
New Mexico made when it was denied COSI:
In the instant case, GASCO has failed to demonstrate its need for
COSI rate relief in order to attract capital. Unlike PNM, the com-

pany has not presented us with any definite plans to be implemented

which require the attraction of vast amounts of capital from potential investors. The company relies on its projected gas shortages to
59.
60.
61.
62.

Case No. 1419 at 60.
In re Gas Co. of N.M., 21 P.U.R. 4th 159 (1977).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 165.
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establish its need for COSI. Even the estimated capital expenditures

for gas storage, liquified natural gas (LNG), and synthetic natural gas
(SNG) projects are nowhere near the relative magnitude of capital
requirements which PNM faced ... 4

The evidence should show, in short, that the utility requires an
amount of capital that cannot be attracted at a reasonable cost if
traditional ratemaking techniques are continued. 6 4
The Public Service Company of New Mexico was able to meet the
burden by showing that they were in jeopardy of losing their "AA"
bond rating, which would mean that they would have to pay future
creditors a higher interest rate in order to attract debt capital.6 S
Moreover, because of extensive planning, the Public Service Company was able to show its expected savings. "PNM was able to quantify the money savings expected to be derived from COSI because
PNM's plans were specific as to the projected time, cost, and capital
needs required for their implementation." 6 6
Unlike the Public Service Company in Case No. 1196, the Gas
Company of New Mexico was not able to predict any such savings. In
fact, their own witness for this issue stated that COSI would not
reduce the company's cost of capital. 6 1 Relying on this expert testimony, the Commission found that one of COSI's primary purposes,
the reduction of capital costs, would be unfulfilled.
The Public Service Company was able to show with "clear and
convincing evidence on the record that without COSI PNM would
helplessly suffer continued revenue deficiencies. ' 6 8 The Gas Company of New Mexico made no such showing:
Indexing does speed up the process by which rate relief is granted
and does involve some shortening of the time normally involved in
implementing rate relief. However, GASCO has not established that
its continued viability requires the extraordinary rate treatment of

COSI. The record supports the conclusion that the traditional procedures of this commission are currently adequate to meet the stated
6 9
needs of the company.

Moreover, it follows that the company must also show that COSI
will result in a reduction of capital costs. The Gas Company of New
Mexico was unable to make this showing, primarily because of its
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

166.
167.
165.
165.
166-67.
165.
165.
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and
corporate structure. It is a vertically integrated natural gas utility
7" The
Company.
Union
Southern
is a division of a larger company,
of the parent
cost of capital, therefore, is dependent on the activities
7 1 COSI's impact on
all.
at
it
influence
not
company, and COSI may
cost of capital, if any, would be very difficult to measure in this
situation because of this additional variable.
The Public Service Company, unlike the Gas Company of New
Mexico, is in a better position to take advantage of COSI's equity
capital cost reductions because it is less influenced by the activities
of its related non-utility division. Changes in investor perceptions
would, therefore, be more easily measured and influenced by the
utility's operations under COSI.
The inability of the Gas Company to meet its burden of proof
may also be due to the fact that two-thirds of its total cost of service
is already passed on to the consumers under an automatic fuel adjustment clause. 72 The Commission believed it unlikely that the remaining one-third could not be dealt with by traditional ratemaking
methods. 7 3
THE GOALS OF COST OF SERVICE INDEXING
When the New Mexico Public Service Commission first implemented COSI in 1975, it delineated several goals which it hoped to
achieve by using the new system. A discussion of each goal and how
COSI was designed to realize each goal follows.
Capital Costs and Attraction of Capital
COSI was designed to reduce simultaneously the Company's cost
of capital and improve the Company's ability to attract new capital. 7 4 This result would be achieved by lowering the perceived degree
of risk to the investor. Historically, regulated public utilities such as
the Public Service Company of New Mexico have been able to obtain
capital on the open market at lower costs than unregulated companies. 75 This was because of the relatively low risk to those who
invested in the regulated companies. Changing economic conditions
resulted in utilities having more difficulty in obtaining capital, and a
rise in the costs of obtaining capital. Investors perceived that the risk
of investing in utilities had increased, primarily because costs of
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164.
In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 8 P.U.R. 4th at 131 (1975).
Id. at 128-129.
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doing business increased faster than revenues. Such cost increases
were due to rapid inflation, growth in demand for services, and
growth in capital intensity requirements. These include such things as
fuel costs, wages and salaries, employee benefits, supplies, taxes,
pollution controls and costs of capital. Electric utility companies are
also having to switch from oil fired generators to coal fired generators and possibly to nuclear generating systems, all of which require
an extraordinary amount of capital. With the changed economic circumstances, revenues were not keeping pace with capital needs and
the traditional ratemaking methods and procedures further aggravated the electric utility companies situation. COSI was to remedy
this situation, at least to some degree, by passing costs on to consumers without tedious intervening rate cases and their attendant
uncertainties.
COSI supplies a greater certainty of earnings because the procedure is based upon a predictable regulatory lag. Regulatory lag is
the amount of time between the actual increase in costs to the company and the time when the company is allowed to increase its
revenues to cover the costs. Regulatory lag under traditional procedures is unpredictable. It is dependent upon the length of time
between rate change requests by the company, the length of time
allocated for hearings which have uncertain results, and the length of
time necessary to render a decision. A utility which uses COSI can
predict that rates will be changed on a regular basis to reflect cost
changes. Predictability is a major factor in reducing the perceived risk
of an investment.
If capital is attracted at a lower cost than would be possible with a
traditional ratemaking procedure, then not only would a company be
able to better serve the public interest, but the savings attributable to
lower capital costs could be passed on to consumers. The Commission clearly recognized its obligations:
The task here, as in any service rate proceeding, are [sic] to enable
[the Public Service Company of New Mexico] to recover its current
costs of service and also to enable it to better serve the public in the
future. The principal requirement of both tasks is associated with
capital. On the one hand, we should seek to devise a regulatory
method that enables the public utility to recover its costs of capital
and to create a regulatory climate that may result in a reduction of
such costs; on the other, we should permit the company to attract
the capital it must have in order to better serve the public in the
6
future. 7
76. Id. at 125.
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COSI Would Not Reduce PNM's Incentives to Resist
Cost Increases
The Commission apparently recognized that an automatic adjustment could be a disincentive to the Company's attempts to resist
cost increases. Theoretically, automatic adjustment clauses act to
recoup costs in a short period of time without tight regulatory scrutiny. Thus a utility may not feel compelled to be efficient since it
knows that its cost increases will be covered in the near term through
automatic rate adjustments. The Commission established two mechanisms to ameliorate this tendency-a so-called "rate of return band"
and a moderate regulatory lag of three months between rate adjustments.
The Commission in Case No. 1419 described the operation of rate
of return band:
In Commission Case No. 1196 the Commission allowed PNM the
opportunity (and not the guarantee) to earn in the 13 -14% Return on Equity (herein named ROE) range. If PNM earned below
13 % ROE, it would be allowed to raise its revenue requirements to
realize a 13 % ROE; if on the other hand, PNM earned more than
14 % ROE, the company would be required to reduce its ROE to
14 %. If PNM earned between 131h% ROE and 14% ROE no
adjustment would be required. The spread between the upper and
lower limits of the ROE was to offer an incentive to PNM to use
efficient methods7 and to increase its productivity so as to achieve a
financial reward.
In regard to the three month regulatory lag under COSI, the 1196
Order predicted that this lag would be a sufficient incentive to the
Company to reduce costs and at the same time reduce investors'
perception of risk in investing in the Company.
COSI Would Enable PNM to Implement Efficiencies
Devised by Load Management
The Commission opined that COSI should maximize the Company's ability to plan and implement effective systems and methods
for the generation, transmission, distribution, use and conservation
of electric energy. It was believed that if management was provided
with the means to attract capital cheaply, was provided with adequate incentives to resist cost increases, and was exempted from
costly regulatory proceedings, it could maintain adequate services
less expensively than under traditional ratemaking.
In essence, the Commission's decision in 1196 reflected a great
77. Case No. 1419 at 41.
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degree of confidence in the Company's management abilities. It was
premised on the belief that COSI's predicted attributes would allow
management to excel with a concomitant benefit to the ratepayer.
Commission Oversight of the Company
Indexing, when implemented by the Commission in Case No.
1196, was perceived to be a method which would allow the Commission to increase its regulatory oversight of the Public Service Company. The traditional ratemaking method was becoming increasingly
complex, leaving less time to inquire into issues concerning management efficiency, demand and growth forecasts, construction programs and the like. COSI, on the other hand, was designed to decrease hearing time, leaving the Commission free to conduct
investigations into the operations of the utility. It was hoped that
some of the more important policy questions could be dealt with
because of a decrease in the work load associated with traditional
rate cases. In this way, the Commission would be in a better position
to protect the interests of consumers, investors and the public. The
Commission stated in Case No. 1196:
With the companies that come before us, we are reeling from one
urgent revenue deficiency to the next, with no time to systemat-

ically investigate and reflect upon management efficiency, prospective growth in demand as a justification for new plant certification,
service rate structuring as a method of more efficiently allocating
and conserving resources, minimum cost financing programs and
other matters which may result in cost savings, as well as increased
reliability and quality of service. 7 8

Toward that end, the Commission made it clear that it would not
make any changes in either the "fundamental methods of calculation" of the indexing factor or in the allowed return on equity
percentage without notice and a hearing. 7 9 The Commission however failed to define its use of the term "fundamental methods of
calculation." Thus, the triggering device for hearings under COSI was
vague and ambiguous. 8 0
78. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 8 P.U.R. 4th at 120 (1975).
79. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. 1196 at 48 (1975)
(unreported portion of Order).
80. The Commission's failure to express a meaning of this language created a regulatory
problem. PNM sent a letter to the Commission requesting an accounting modification to its
calculation of its accumulated deferred investment tax credit under Sec. 46(f) of the IRS
Code. PNM indicated that unless the Commission granted the company its request, PNM
would lose the tax credit. The Commission granted PNM's request without a public hearing.
In Case 1419 the intervenors argued that PNM's request amounted to a fundamental change
in the method of calculating the rate of return. The company argued that the change was
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Conservation
Cost of service indexing was also supposed to encourage energy
conservation. By using an adjustment factor which applied to each
kilowatt hour of consumption, regardless of the amount of consumption by each consumer, those who consume the most will bear the
greatest portion of increased costs. This was intended to cut down on
consumption increases by providing consumers with pricing signals
which indicated the true cost of his consumption patterns. In other
words, the COSI adjustment would be a contemporaneous indication
to the consumer of the true costs of his utility uses. The consumer
could then choose whether the value of the service received was
equivalent to the price he had to pay for such service. Thus, he
would be presented with an economic choice: Do I wish to spend my
limited resources on utility service or on other goods available in the
society?
THE REVIEW OF COST OF SERVICE INDEXING
Beginning in 1975, COSI was used by the Commission to set rates
for the Public Service Company of New Mexico. In early 1978, the
Commission issued an order of investigation which initiated a review
of this ratemaking procedure. 8 1 The review addressed several issues:
whether COSI accomplished the goals which it was designed to meet;
whether COSI should be terminated or modified in light of its effectiveness in realizing its goals; whether COSI is consistent with the
policies of the Public Utility Act and traditional regulatory goals;
and, if COSI is continued, whether any of the modifications or recommendations proposed by any party to the proceeding should be
adopted. 82 The Commission's conclusion concerning each goal previously discussed follows.
Cost of Capitaland Attraction of Capital
As noted previously, a utility company such as Public Service
Company raises capital through the issuance of three types of securities: equity capital, long-term debt, and preferred stock. The 1196
Order predicted that COSI would result in a reduction of equity
not fundamental and that the Commission was acting in reliance on an information letter
received from the IRS. The Commission ultimately ruled that the previously allowed treatment of the tax credit was inappropriate. Case No. 1419, Phase II Order 5-7.
81. Case No. 1419. The review was divided into two phases. The second phase was
completed on May 1, 1979. References to the Phase II decision will hereinafter be noted as:
Case No. 1419, Phase II.
82. Case No. 1419 at 5.
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costs to the Company. The Commission concluded that a savings in
Public Service Company's equity costs did occur.
The Commission feels that the weight of the evidence in the record supports a conclusion that [COSI] has been a primary factor in
reducing [Public Service Company of New Mexico's] cost of capital.
In regard to equity savings,.., testimony and analysis have indicated a decrease in equity capital costs from .85% to above 2%....
In the final analysis, [COSI] may not be a causal agent for the 8noted
3
decrease, but it surely appears to have been a significant factor.
The Commission was less convinced of COSI's impact upon the
Company's ability to reduce its long-term debt and preferred stock
costs.

In regard to [COSI's] impact upon preferred and long-term debt,
we are less confident of its past impact on reducing costs and even
less confident of its future impact on these costs due to [Public
84
Service Company of New Mexico's] current financial parameters.
Yet the Commission determined that COSI did enhance the utility's
present and past ability to maintain an advantageous bond rating.8 s
In sum, the Commission found that COSI achieved its capital
savings goal and enhanced the Company's ability to attract capital.
An independent analysis of COSI conducted by the National Regulatory Research Institute, a federally funded institute providing technical assistance and research for state utility commissions, arrived at
the same basic conclusions as the Commission. 86 However, in their
opinion, COSI's continued success in reducing capital costs and attracting capital is doubtful. In fact, they concluded that COSI's benefits were temporary and now seem to be past.8 This conclusion is
attributed to the Company's inability since the inception of COSI to
earn its allowed rate of return. In their opinion the investors are
more impressed by the "bottom line"-amount earned-than the regulatory methodology employed.8 8
Cost Increases
The Commission determined that COSI did not provide adequate
incentives to the Public Service Company of New Mexico to resist
83. Id. at 36.
84. Id. at 36.
85. Id. at 71.
86. A. Kaufman & R. Profozich, The New Mexico Cost of Service Index-An Effort in
Regulatory Innovation (1979) (Report for the National Regulatory Research Institute).
87. Id. at V.
88. Id. at 48.
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cost increases.8 9 COSI was designed to supply these incentives by the
use of two devices. One device was the allowed return on equity
range between 13.5% and 14.5%, the theory being that the Company
would try to increase its chances of earning the higher rate of return
(14.5%) by striving to keep its costs down. But in the three years
between 1975 and 1978, the Company was able to achieve a return
within the allowed range only once. 9 0 The Commission did not offer
an explanation for this result, but decided that the device was obviously not having the desired effect. Indeed, the Commission ultimately discarded the rate of return band entirely. This was due in
part to the Commission's adoption of an annual COSI adjustment.
The Commission allowed PNM to set rates based upon a fixed return
on equity of 13.5%.
The other device which was to supply an incentive to keep costs
down was the use of regulatory lag. As explained earlier, this is the
time lapse between the periodic rate adjustments. Once rates have
been adjusted, based on the accounting report of the previous period,
the Company must keep costs down to the same levels as were recorded in that accounting report for it to meet the allowed return.
The methodology prescribed in Case No. 1196 called for rate adjustments every three months.
The Commission, in its review of COSI in Case No. 1419, concluded that "regulatory lag theoretically is the strongest incentive in
the regulatory environment to reduce costs" 9 1 and decided that it
should be lengthened to twelve months.
The decision to increase regulatory lag appears to have been based
in part upon the Company's inability to demonstrate that it had
resisted cost increases under COSI. The Company relied upon a management audit to justify a claim of increased efficiencies under COSI.
However, this claim was discounted since the Company was unable
to establish a causal relationship between COSI and the alleged efficiencies. The Commission also gave little weight to other evidence
submitted by staff, intervenors, and the Company which attempted
to measure pre- and post-COSI productivity. The Commission was
critical of the evidence since it was based upon unreliable tools and
techniques for productivity measures.
It would seem that the Commission's determination to increase
regulatory lag resulted from a combination of factors. First, the
Commission was unconvinced that the evidence supported its prediction that the Company would resist cost increases. It seems that the
89. Case No. 1419 at 71.
90. Id.at 41-42.
91. Id.at 46.
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Commission expected a convincing demonstration of the fact by the
Company. When the Company failed to meet this burden, the Commission relied upon the incentives inherent in regulatory lag as a cost
resister. Second, as noted above, the Commission appears to have
been motivated to increase regulatory lag on the basis of its prediction that it would not seriously diminish COSI's ability to enhance
the Company's ability to attract capital at lower costs. Finally, the
Commission seems to have lost some confidence in Public Service
Company management's motivation to resist cost increases.
The prudence of PNM's construction program has been severely
challenged by the parties to this proceeding. Dr. Halvorsen has criticized the company's load forecast. The company's failure to maximize efforts in this area of energy conservation has been raised.
Professor Gordon suggests that the company has been overly aggressive in obtaining the rights to serve the growing mining load in the
northwest portion of the State, thereby undertaking the construction of plant for a large, undiversified and risky load. Dr. Gordon
also questions the prudence of PNM's management decision to construct plant to serve wholesale customers who may choose to take
service from other sources at some future time. In addition, it is
alleged that PNM's ambitious investment program is predicated upon
management's own ambitions rather than on the public, investor and
consumer interests. These allegations are based upon Gordon's expert analysis and cannot be ignored in our consideration of the
appropriate action to take in regard to PNM's cash flow problems.
The stakes are enormous. The public interest of the State is at the
heart of the issue. If PNM's construction program is prudent under
present and future economic conditions we must be willing to assure
PNM the ability to attract the necessary capital to continue its current construction programs. In providing this assurance, we must
determine the least burdensome means upon the ratepayer to
achieve this result. We are not confident from our review of the
evidence in this case of either the prudence of PNM's construction
program or that assuming its prudence, PNM's proposed modificacheapest means available to the ratepayer
tion to COSI are [sic]
9 2 the
to achieve the goals.
In sum, the Commission in 1419 has substantially retreated from
its optimistic viewpoint on management's good faith activities to
resist cost increases under COSI. The 1419 Order reflects a significant regulatory attitude change toward Public Service Company's
activities. The Commission's confidence in the utility's operations and
planning abilities has apparently diminished. Indeed, the Commission
92. Case No. 1419, Phase II at 11.
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indicated its intention to conduct a full review of the Company's
93
construction program and method for financing it.
COSI Does Not Guarantee that Management Will
Implement Efficiencies
The Commission found that its earlier prediction that COSI would
enable Public Service Company to plan and implement measures to
reduce customer costs and increase efficiencies is contingent upon
good management planning.9 4 In other words, COSI's positive impact upon the Company's ability to attract capital, to reduce capital
costs, to resist cost increase, and to maintain adequate regulatory
oversight does not guarantee that management will take advantage of
these attributes. COSI will provide an opportunity to meet the
above-noted objectives.
Again, these findings by the Commission appear to reflect its
disenchantment with the Company's management. They depict a
Commission attitude that utility management is not infallible and
may require more regulatory scrutiny than previously thought. The
Commission seems to be indicating a belief that it must be more
active in evaluating the reasonableness and prudence of the Company's plans and operations.
Commission Oversight of the Company
As previously stated, the 1975 COSI procedure gave the Commission ten days after an accounting report was filed to determine whether the report was proper and whether the rate change should be
allowed. 9 It was hoped that COSI would give the Commission more
time to investigate Company management decisions and expenditures. It was found, however, to have exactly the opposite effect. 9 6
The Executive Director for the Commission stated that "less time is
available to the staff for other than verification or straight auditing
functions. Those 'other' functions might include the monitoring of
management efficiency, the monitoring of the capital expansion program, analysis of planned generations mix, etc."' 9
The Commission also determined that COSI had imposed an undue burden upon its staff to discover regulatory problems associated
with Company operations. Once an expenditure was questioned, how93. Id. at 16.

94. Case No. 1419 at 72.
95. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. 1196 at 41 (1975)

(unreported portion of Order).

96. Case No. 1419 at 49-50.
97. Id. at 50.
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ever, the burden of showing its reasonableness shifted back to the
Company. Under traditional ratemaking procedures, the utility has
the burden to go forward with evidence to support its rate increase
request.
The result of the short time frame and shifted burden was that it
placed "an extremely difficult, if not impossible burden on ...the
staff. . . . [The staff] is reduced to the role of being a rubber stamp,

and the frequency with which it must rubber stamp COSI reports for
the companies under this jurisdiction seriously limits its time for
more useful endeavors." 9 8
An example of a questionable expenditure by Public Service Company, which was not discovered by the Commission's auditors, is the
Company's purchase of a Learjet in 1977. The Company did not
clearly notify the Commission of its purchase, 9 9 nor did the Commission staff have time to "go behind the books" to determine the
existence of the purchase. 1 00 The Commission learned of the purchase, after the fact, from an outside source. Hearings on the reasonableness of the purchase were then held in early 1978, and the Commission found that the expenditure was "unreasonable and
imprudent" in light of its costs and benefits.1 01
The Commission held, in its 1978 review, that these procedural
problems could be overcome by use of new Company reporting
methods, new time frames, such as annual adjustments rather than
quarterly adjustments, and longer times for analysis and review by
the accountants. The Commission further withdrew its confidence in
the auditor verification process:
Finally, we no longer believe that only an auditor's review is a
sufficient means to regulate utility operations. It is only one function among many that must be performed. The verification of the
COSI report is not the type of regulation which will assure a just and
reasonable end result.' 02
Impact Upon Conservation
Contrary to the 1196 Order, the Commission decided that imposing the COSI factor as an adjustment applied equally to each
kilowatt hour of electricity consumed, regardless of the total amount
consumed by an individual customer, did not provide proper price
signals to consumers.
98. Id. at 51.
99. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M.'s Purchase of a Learjet 35-A, N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Case No. 1408 at 7 (1978) (hereinafter Case No. 1408).
100. Case No. 1419 at 56.
101. Case No. 1408 at 12.
102. Case No. 1419 at 56-57.
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By applying the indexing factor equally to large and small consumers, the Commission found that the Company was charging large
consumers more than their actual cost of service while charging small
consumers less than the actual cost of supplying the service.' 03 The
effect may be that while large consumers are encouraged to use less,
small consumers may be encouraged to use more electricity. The
Commission suggested that the underlying rate design be changed,
possibly to reflect actual costs at various times of day and in various
seasons.' 04 By giving consumers a better "price signal," that is by
fixing rates as closely as possible to the actual cost of supplying the
electricity, which would theoretically reduce peak load consumption,
conservation of energy as well as lower costs may result.
In sum, the Commission raised doubts that COSI had the beneficial impact on conservation originally conceived. It reserved final
judgment on this matter until it completed a total review of the
Company's rate structure.
THE COMMISSION'S MODIFICATION OF COSI
After analyzing the evidence presented in Case No. 1419, the
Commission concluded that COSI should be modified. The modifications included:
1. elimination of the quarterly adjustment and institution of an
annual adjustment based upon year end common equity.
2. the development of specific procedures governing the Commission's monitoring analysis, evaluation and enforcement under
COSI.
3. elimination of the rate of return band on common equity.
The Commission's decision to modify COSI in this manner was
based upon the following:
COSI has met its two primary objectives-reduction of capital
costs and the enhancement of PNM's ability to attract capital. Thus,
COSI has benefited the ratepayers of New Mexico. In addition the
record reflects that PNM's growth in customer rates has not been
unreasonable when compared to other growth utilities.
As constituted in its present form, COSI does not appear to provide PNM's management with sufficient incentives to reduce cost
increases and inefficiencies. It also does not provide adequate regulatory oversight of PNM's operations and public input into the ratemaking process since it shifts the burden to staff and intervenors to
discover potential problems. These deficiencies do not warrant a
103. Id. at 57-58.
104. Id at 58.
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termination of the COSI experiment. They do require that the Commission undertake modifications to the COSI methodology in order
to assure that its end results are just and reasonable and consistent
with the goals of the Public Utility Act § 67-3-1.
The modifications we will attempt to devise have the following
goal: To maximize the continuation of COSI's positive impact upon
the reduction of PNM's capital costs and capital attraction and to
minimize the negative impact of COSI upon (1) PNM's incentives to
ability to adequately
keep costs down and
1 (2) the Commission's
regulate PNM's rates. 0
Annual Adjustment in Year End Equity
The Commission reasoned that the institution of an annual adjustment would not reduce COSI's positive impacts on Public Service
Company's capital costs and attraction attributes since the modification maintains the predictability and certainty of a modest regulatory lag-the main reason found by the Commission to result in
capital cost savings and attraction.' 06 Further, the Commission
reasoned that the annual adjustment would provide the Commission
staff with more time for an in-depth review of the Company's opera1
tions and performance under COSI. 07 Moreover, the Commission
concluded that the ratepayers would be benefited by a less frequent
rate adjustment since they would anticipate a fixed utility charge for
a reasonable planning period.' 1 8 Finally, the Commission expressed
its belief that an annual adjustment would shift the burden of inflation from the ratepayers back to the stockholders.' 09 It is anticipated that since the stockholders would have to wait longer for a rate
change, they would pressure management to be more vigilant in reducing costs. The negative impact of inflation would provide an
incentive to the Company to reduce costs by tightening its operating
and construction budget.
The annual adjustment is to be made on year-end equity. As noted
previously, the 1196 Order mandated a quarterly adjustment based
upon the average twelve month equity investment.' 0 In making this
modification, the Commission stated:
105. Id. at 62-63.
106. Id. at 63.
107. Id. at 66. Case No. 1419, Phase II at 8-9.
108. Id. at 66-67.
109. Id. at 67.
110. For purposes of illustration, the impact of year-end vs. 12-month average equity
investment is as follows. If PNM were to invest a total of 3 million dollars in a given
12-month period, and in the beginning of the period it had a $1 million investment, under
the 1196 Order, it could only earn its allowed rate of return $2 million; however, under the
1419 Order, it can now earn its allowed rate of return on the year-end investment of $3
million.
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First, our decision to allow a return on year-end common equity
is governed by the fact that the company will now operate on an
annual adjustment rather than a quarterly adjustment. Under the
quarterly adjustment the Commission only allowed the index to be
computed on the company's twelve month average equity. This proviso was perceived as a cost reducing incentive in the Order in 1196.
However, with the elimination of the quarterly adjustment and the
institution of an annual adjustment this incentive is no longer appropriate. As noted in our December 29, 1979 Order, the annual adjustment should afford PNM the desirable cost reducing incentive.' 1
The Commission also recognized a potential problem inherent in
the year-end equity approach.
We are cognizant that the return on year-end equity may provide
the company with an incentive to increase its equity portion of its
capital structure at the close of each year. We do not believe that the
company would engage in such activity. However, in order to provide PNM with adequate notice of the Commission's concern over
the existence of such a circumstance in the future, the continued
allowance of year-end equity will require that the amount of yearend equity reflected in future COSI reports must be consistent with
a prudent capital structure. Thus, the Commission reserves the right
to apply the COSI adjustment to a hypothetical capital structure, 12
month average equity experience, or other reasonable method to
correct any future problems which might arise under a year-end
equity approach.' 1'2

In sum, the Commission decision to go to an annual adjustment
based upon year-end equity investment is an attempt to maintain
COSI's benefits and reduce its regulatory costs. This modification
should result in a narrowing of the gap between traditional ratemaking and the automatic nature of COSI. It implies a shift in Commission philosophy regarding utility costs. The Commission has
departed from the philosophy that costs cannot be controlled by
management to the philosophy that the utility can reduce costs if it
is provided sufficient incentives.
In anticipation of an allegation that this modification would
destroy the COSI methodology, the Commission Order cited the
following testimony in opposition:
Q. In your recommendations finally, you have in a sense devised a
new "indexing system" where you do not have quarterly adjustments but yearly, an annual adjustment; is that correct?
111. Case No. 1419, Phase II at 9.
112. Id. at 9.
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A. I wouldn't call it a new system. That is just a very modest modification, just doing the report once a year instead of once a
quarter.
Q. I guess that's my question.
Do you consider that still to have all the benefits of COSI and to
be essentially a COSI method?
A. In the case leading up to the adoption of COSI, I believe that
company witness indicated that some regulatory lag is desirable.
Going from quarterly to annual adjustments increases the regulatory lag slightly.
I believe it is a reasonable and sound solution to the problem. I
don't advocate going back to the old system. This system relieves
the company and in particular staff with an impossible burden
of report reviewing and also achieves the essential benefits of
having a predictable, modest regulatory lag.
Q. How does that differ from having a yearly rate case?
A. It differs in that the procedure is less formal and is more automatic and therefore deals with the regulatory lag. It does not
deal with all the problems of regulations as Mr. Swartwout
pointed out. Outside of COSI, the regular regulatory procedure,
you will have problems of rate design, any changes in how COSI
is implemented in terms of such things as say the treatment of
deferred income taxes would be outside of the COSI reports; but
to go to a regular annual calculation of revenue requirements
would first of all require an annual hearing which is more time
consuming and burdensome, and there's no guarantee the hearing
would have a duration of-First there's no guarantee it would be
annual, and there's no guarantee that the hearing would generate
a solution in two to three months whereas here you guarantee
that once a year there will be an adjustment in the rates for
certain prescribed changes in conditions which I believe is desirable. 11 3
Whether this COSI modification will have its intended results must
be measured by time and experience. If the Commission's perception
is correct, the modified COSI methodology may become more acceptable to other Commissions.
Modifications in Reporting Procedures
The Commission, because it found that COSI had increased its
workload, and because it found that verification of Public Service
Company's quarterly reports was difficult and time consuming, has
undertaken to modify the existing reporting and procedural require113. Case No. 1419 at 64-65.
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ments. The Commission has required its staff to develop procedural
and specific functional reporting requirements governing COSI. The
purpose of the modifications is to insure that the COSI privilege will
not be abused by the Company and to increase regulatory oversight
of the Company.
The staff's proposals, which have not yet been adopted or rejected
by the Commission, include a three-month time period for staff and
intervenors to review the Company's COSI reports.' 1'4 Challenges to
the reports by the staff or intervenors may be made during that time
period. If the Commission decides that any challenges are for good
cause, a formal, public hearing shall be conducted. If there are no
challenges for good cause, or the Commission determines at a hearing
that the accounting reports are proper, the COSI factor as determined from the accounting report will become effective.
Another proposal is to review each year or two, the rate of return
on equity.' ' I If it is found that the cost of capital to the Company
has increased or decreased, the allowed rate of return will be adjusted
accordingly. The proposed procedure calls for a formal public hearing to the appropriate rate of return.
The staff has also proposed that a capital expansion program review be conducted.' 16 This would allow the Commission to scrutinize Company construction plans and its financing of new facilities.
Questions concerning the Company's forecast of future demand for
their services and the Company's need to attract new capital can be
explored.
The staff would also have perpetual reporting requirements whereby the Commission and its, staff would have access to the basic
information and data necessary for regulatory review on a continual
basis.' ' I It is thought that this procedure will provide enough information to allow the reviewer to make informed judgments as to
where and when further investigation is warranted.
The proposed procedural reforms are designed to subject the operations of Public Service Company to considerable scrutiny. The proposed time frames will allow the Commission and its staff adequate
time to properly review information. In fact, the proposed procedures may well subject the Company to greater regulatory oversight than was done under traditional ratemaking methods. It is
114. R. Swarthout, Memorandum to the Commission on Staff Recommendations for
Procedural and Specific Functional Reporting Requirements Governing COSI-Pages 67 and
68 of the December 29, 1978 Order of the Commission in Case 1419 re: Public Service
Company of New Meixco (PNM) at 5-7 (Feb. 28, 1979).
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 14.
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hoped that this will allow the Commission to get to the real "bread
and butter" issues.
The Commission also made a specific finding that "unlike traditional ratemaking methods, COSI does not allow adequate participation of interested parties in the ratemaking process."' 18 This conclusion might be interpreted to mean that the Commission not only
supports the active participation of consumers in the ratemaking
process, but recognizes this participation as a real contribution to the
process. In fact, the Commission instructed its Staff to actively involve intervenors in the process of developing rules governing reporting and procedures under COSI.
In the final analysis, the Commission appears to have recognized
that the 1196 Order failed to provide adequate measures to monitor
and evaluate PNM's performance under COSI and failed to create
sufficient enforcement procedures to safeguard the consumer, investor and the public interest from management deficiencies.
Elimination of the ROE Band
The Commission reasoned that under an annual adjustment, the
return on equity band was no longer appropriate.
Upon reflection of the impact of a change from the quarterly to
annual COSI adjustment, we do not believe that a [13.5% to 14.5%
return on equity] band is necessary. As noted in our previous order,
the band has not achieved its desired result of providing PNM with
an incentive to keep its costs down. Additionally, an annual adjustment should provide the Commission with sufficient time to evaluate PNM's capital costs in a timely fashion. Thus, the Commission
in this Order will eliminate the [return on equity] band and set the
company's [return on equity]* on an annual basis and review the
level of [return on equity] for each succeeding annual index adjust-

ment.'

19

THE COSI EXPERIENCE AND THE COMMISSION
Aside from the expressed findings of the Commission in its 1419
Order in support of its modifications to COSI, the COSI experience
in New Mexico provides the electric utility regulatory environment
with a less obvious finding. An experiment by its nature stems from
an hypothesis which it seeks to test. As expressed in 1196, COSI was
to reduce capital costs and enhance capital attraction to a highly
capital intensive industry in general and to the Public Service Company in particular without damaging the fragile balance between the
118. Case No. 1419 at 73.
119. Case No. 1419, Phase II at 9.
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often competing interests which the Public Utility Act mandates the
PSC to preserve. In essence, the Commission in Case 1419 determined that the experiment did not achieve all the desired results
envisioned in the 1196 Order. It did not preserve the balance. Yet,
the Commission did not discard COSI. It concluded that COSI does
have the potential elements to become a more efficient and acceptable regulatory methodology through the imposition of specific
modifications designed to achieve its fundamental goal-to assure the
provision of adequate electric utility service at a just and reasonable
price under dynamic economic conditions.
There is a very important lesson to be learned from COSI. The
lesson does not relate to obvious facts noted in the Order, but rather
must be discerned from unarticulated circumstances. The lesson
stems from the source of a regulatory commission's duty to balance
competing interests in an environment made adversarial by economic
circumstances largely beyond the control of any parties to the
process. The lesson concerns risk-taking; the willingness to step forward into an uncertain and opaque future. The risk taker in this case
is the New Mexico Public Service Commission, but also may apply, in
our opinion, to any public service commission.
A public service commission exists in a legal and political environment. Its members are acutely aware of the conflicting interests that
are impacted by its decisions. These interests more often than not
resort to political and/or legal means to express their pleasure or
displeasure with commission decisions. In such an environment, a
commission tends to hold on to traditional techniques to accomplish
its function. Tradition provides safety. It is a shield against unpleasant accusations and innuendos. Yet, tradition may not be
responsive to changing times. Indeed, it may exacerbate the effects
of hard times. The COSI experience does provide us with some insight into risk-taking and its consequences in the regulatory world.
It must be noted that COSI as a concept was presented to the
Commission as the result of an out-of-court settlement of an earlier
case.' 2 0 The COSI methodology, when inaugurated, was endorsed
by almost all parties to the proceeding-residential consumers, the
Attorney General, the Commission staff, and the Public Service Company. The adversaries agreed to the institution of the experiment and
apparently recognized its potential benefits. Thus, COSI was a product of a compromise not only among competing interests, but also
among adversarial interests. Aside from the merits of the COSI proposal, the compromise itself lessened the political-legal risk associated with the experiment. Thus, the regulatory environment, in this
120. In re Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 7 P.U.R. 4th 166 (1974).
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instance, was conducive to change. The Commission was free to
break from the past and assume a risk. In fact, the risk was shared
among all the parties to the process. And so, an important precondition to regulatory change by a Commission may be the existence of
agreement among the parties to the process.
The COSI experience also teaches us about the importance of
mutual trust and understanding among the Commission, the utility,
and the consumers. It is trust and understanding which appear to be
the fulcrum point of the COSI experiment. Both the utility and the
Commission had to be perceived by the consumers as worthy of their
trust. Two things appear to have eroded that trust: (1) the everincreasing COSI adjustment factor;'21 and (2) Public Service Company's purchase of a Learjet 35-A.' 22 The Learjet case highlighted a
perception by consumers that the Company was abusing its privilege
and the Commission was incapable of monitoring Company activities
under the automatic adjustment clause.. Rather than responding to
the erosion of public trust, the Company argued that it was in the
purview of its management discretion to purchase the plane. It ignored and was insensitive to public sentiment. The upshot of the
dispute was a Commission finding based upon the record that the
purchase was unjust and unreasonable.' 23 As a result of this episode,
all of the Company's expenses and investment became suspect. The
ring of trust had been broken.' 24 The eventual restoration of the
hearing process and total elimination of COSI, whatever its benefits,
was advocated by consumers in 1419. Although, the Commission in
1419 did not eliminate COSI, it did eliminate the quarterly adjustment because it found it to be too difficult to monitor and enforce.
The Commission instructed its staff to develop report and procedural
requirements to assure effective monitoring, evaluating, and enforcement of the adjustment clause.
Thus, the second lesson on regulatory commission risk-taking to
be derived from this history relates to utility company sensitivity and
concern for the risk-taker commission. A utility must recognize that
it and the Commission operate in a fishbowl. A utility granted a
special privilege has a duty to avoid any appearances of unwarranted
or unreasonable expenses or investments.' 2 1 If public trust and confidence erodes, the risk-taker may reconsider its posture.
121. The COSI Adjustment factor rose from .002688 PKW in May of 1975 to .013944
PKW in March of 1979 or approximately an increase of 519%.
122. Case No. 1408.
123. Case No. 1408 at 12.
124. In Case No. 1419 intervenors and staff opposed the continuation of COSI as it was
developed and implemented under Case No. 1196.
125. In Case No. 1419 at 71, the Commission stated "COSI is a privilege, not a right or
entitlement."
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CONCLUSION

The New Mexico Public Service Commission's decision in Case
1419 makes significant modifications to COSI as it operated under
the Commission's Order in 1196. These modifications may or may
not correct the regulatory deficiencies noted in the Commission's
review. Ultimately, the modified COSI's success or failure will be
determined by: (1) Public Service Company's continued ability to
attract capital at low costs; (2) the Commission's ability to develop
reporting and procedural requirements which will assure effective
regulatory oversight over the Company; and (3) future actions taken
by the Company and the Commission to restore public confidence in
the COSI methodology. The Commission has pledged to review COSI
in another two years. Additional regulatory lessons are sure to be
learned in this bold experiment.

